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We study experimentally how taxpayers choose between two tax regimes to fund a public 
good. The first-best tax regime imposes a general, distortion-free income tax. However, this 
tax cannot be enforced. The second-best alternative supplements the income tax by a specific 
commodity tax. This tax cannot be evaded but distorts optimal consumption choices, instead. 
The result is that a large majority of subjects prefer the general income tax regime. The bulk 
of votes is consistent with actual payoffs. We isolate tax morale as cause for payoffs above 
theoretical predictions. 
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 1 Introduction
The theory of optimal taxation is about the distortions introduced by taxes.
The interest of this theory is normative: based on the canonical assumptions of
rational and self-interested taxpayers it gives advice on how to design a tax system
such that the e±ciency cost of taxation is reduced in the best possible way. The
theory of optimal taxation has signi¯cantly contributed to clarify the objectives
of tax policy and to understand the economic properties of tax instruments.
Nevertheless, we have to admit that, relative to the theory's signi¯cance in the
academic ¯eld of public ¯nance, its impact on practical tax policy is meagre (e.g.,
Slemrod 1990).
What limits the relevance of optimal tax formulas for tax policy? Part of the
answer may be that the theory has put too little emphasis on the motives why
people pay taxes. Generally, the theory of optimal taxation presumes that taxes
can be fully enforced. A large body of the literature on tax compliance illustrates
that this assumption is not warranted empirically (for a survey see, Andreoni,
Erard, and Feinstein 1998). This literature broadly falls into two groups. The
¯rst adheres to the standard assumptions in economics and regards the decision
of paying taxes as one that depends on the deterrent e®ects of legal sanctions
(Allingham and Sandmo 1972, Yitzhaki 1987). According to this view, people
face a decision under risk when they trade o® the cost of paying taxes against
the bene¯ts of remaining undetected. For a short time now the theory of optimal
taxation pays attention to this literature. For instance, the models by Cremer
and Gahvari (1993), Boadway, Marchand, and Pestieau (1994) and Richter and
Boadway (2003) acknowledge that there exists an e±ciency cost of tax evasion,
which ought to be traded o® against that of tax distortion.
The second group of the literature on tax compliance has developed from the
behavioral branch of economics. Most taxpayers face small expected penalties
from tax evasion. Nevertheless, most people abide by the tax law (e.g., Slemrod
and Yitzhaki 2002). There is now abundant empirical evidence that people in
many instances do not act in their pure self-interest and, leaning against other
social sciences, the behavioral literature on tax compliance incorporates social
motives to explain a sense of morale or social duty to pay taxes (for references see,
1Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998: 851 ®.). Recently, behavioral economics has
gained enormous momentum and is on the verge of becoming mainstream in some
¯elds within economics (for surveys see, e.g., Rabin 2002, Fehr and Falk 2002,
Camerer 2003). The theory of optimal taxation accounts for social preferences
by the concept of social welfare functions. But this concept is based on ad hoc
reasoning rather than on real behavior. So far the theory of optimal taxation has
not dealt with the question how new assumptions about individual preferences
would modify traditional optimal tax rules.
In this paper, we illustrate that the normative policy implications derived
from the existing framework of optimal taxation theory may be misleading un-
less it accounts for basic insights from recent research in behavioral economics.
Instead of studying normative standards of what tax authorities might do, in an
experiment we observe the behavior of taxpayers who are motivated by real in-
centives. Our study is particularly centered around a behavioral pattern in public
goods experiments, which is highly robust and well documented in the literature
(see, Ledyard 1995). In these experiments subjects typically contribute 40 to
60% of their endowment to the public good although sel¯sh individuals would
contribute nothing. In our setup a public good is funded by individual taxes and
we will refer to tax payments above theoretical predictions as "tax morale".1 We
illustrate the welfare implications of tax morale in our design and contrast them
against the normative predictions of optimal taxation theory.
We apply experimental methods since, for obvious reasons, data on tax com-
pliance is di±cult to come by in the ¯eld. In contrast, in an experiment we know
people's incomes and we can observe tax payments. In the ¯eld the economic
e®ects of taxation typically interact with numerous circumstances that are dif-
¯cult to control. As a consequence, attempts to evaluate tax instruments with
observational data are prone to substantial di±culties (for discussions see, e.g.,
Creedy 2000, Saez 2001, Fullerton and Metcalf 2002). A virtue of experimental
methods is that we can compare di®erent tax regimes under true ceteris paribus
conditions (see, e.g., Quirmbach, Swenson, and Vines 1996). For instance, in an
experiment it is particularly straightforward to measure the relative e±ciency of
1This is in line with previous contributions, e.g., by Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992).
2alternative tax regimes.
Another advantage of experimental methods is that it enables us to shed
some light on the role of tax morale for the political feasibility of tax reform
and the endogenous evolution of the tax system.2 For this reason, we allow
taxpayers to vote between two tax regimes to fund the public good. This choice
is characterized by a tradeo® between tax distortion and tax evasion. The theory
provides a clear-cut prediction of the size of this tradeo®. However, the actual
weight of the tradeo® is endogenously determined by tax morale, i.e., the amount
of taxes paid in excess of theoretical predictions. Our interest is to see whether
tax morale can induce taxpayers/voters to implement a tax regime that is not
feasible in the standard framework of optimal taxation theory.
The basic design is as follows: Participants in the experiment gain utility
from consuming a set of private goods and a public good. In a referendum they
choose between two tax schemes to fund the public good. The G-scheme imposes
a [G]eneral income tax on endowments which subjects declare for taxation. The
tax is e±cient in the sense that it does not distort consumption choices. But the
tax cannot be enforced and opportunistic individuals will not declare any taxes.
Under the rules of the S-scheme the income tax applies together with a [S]peci¯c
commodity tax. The commodity tax bears an e±ciency cost from distorting the
private consumption choice. Nevertheless, assuming rational behavior, the S-
scheme increases overall e±ciency by raising receipts for funding the public good
without enforcement.
In the experiment we implement conditions such that rational self-interested
agents would prefer the distortionary S-scheme. This prediction is compared
against an alternative prediction based on abundant evidence regarding the vol-
untary contribution of public goods. In line with the insights from this literature,
we hypothesize that to fund the public good people are inclined to pay income
taxes in spite of an individual incentive to free-ride. If tax morale is high, the G-
scheme will be overall more e±cient. On the other hand, if tax morale is humble,
the S-scheme will dominate the G-scheme.
2For discussions on how non-sel¯sh preferences as well as heuristics and biases in judgement
may translate into policy outcomes see, e.g., Quattrone and Tversky (1988), McCa®ery (2000),
Tyran and Sausgruber (2002), Slemrod and Krishna (2003).
3The results show that tax morale is essential in trading o® the e±ciency cost
of the two tax systems: against the predictions of standard theory the income
tax (G-scheme), which cannot be formally enforced, results in the same overall
e±ciency as the speci¯c commodity tax (S-scheme), which sets a limit to free-
riding. Moreover, in voting subjects reveal a strong preference for the G-scheme,
i.e., a majority of subjects rejects the theoretically favored alternative. We inter-
pret these results as strong indication for the necessity to incorporate behavioral
aspects of taxation into an encompassing framework of optimal taxation.
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we explain the experimental
design and discuss our hypotheses. Section 3 presents the results and section 4
concludes.
2 Experimental Design
Each participant in the experiment is a taxpayer. Taxpayers are organized into
groups of size N. Every subject receives an endowment Ei drawn from a known
distribution with support [E; E]. Subjects can declare any share of their en-
dowment for taxation. Call di the endowment subject i declares for taxation at
rate ¿ 2 [0;1). Disposable income thus is ei = Ei ¡ ¿di. The taxpayer can use
disposable income to purchase individual quantities of two commodities xi and
yi. Goods are priced at px and py. We think of x as a speci¯c commodity that
can be taxed whereas y is some composite numeraire good. Rational taxpayers
maximize payo® subject to the budget constraint ei = xipx(1 + t) + yipy, where
t ¸ 0 is the rate of the speci¯c tax that marks up to the price of commodity x.
The subject's payo® is determined according to:
¼i = xiyi + G: (1)
Here, xiyi is the utility from privately consuming (xi;yi) and G = ®T the
utility of public good provision ¯nanced by tax receipts T raised from N subjects.
The parameter ®, with 0 < ® < 1, is the public good's marginal per capita return.
Endowment points not collected as taxes and not spent on commodity purchases
result in zero payo®.
4Experimental subjects vote between two tax schemes to fund the public good:
the G-scheme imposes a non-enforceable income tax and places emphasis on tax
morale as social mechanism to sustain e±ciency. More speci¯cally, we implement
this by purely appealing to tax morale, i.e., by not monitoring tax compliance
at all.3 In the S-scheme commodity x is taxed. Since it is in the self-interest
to purchase this commodity, the S-scheme provides an e®ective mechanism to
prevent free-riding on taxes raised from other members of the society. We now
explain the two tax schemes in full detail.
i) G-scheme: general income tax (¿ > 0, t = 0): Assume that all tax receipts
are raised e±ciently via a general tax ¿ on endowments. For any disposable
income ei, and monetary amounts ex
i and (ei ¡ ex
i) spent on commodities x and
















Regardless of tax declarations di, a subject maximizes payo® when half of
disposable income is spent on commodity x, i.e. ex¤



























, it follows that a rational taxpayer reduces tax
declarations as long as ® <
ei
2pxpy. If, for instance, ® <
E(1¡¿)
2pxpy , the optimal decla-
ration is d¤
i = 0 always. Declaring taxes would, however, be e±ciency enhancing
if the total value generated from funding the public good by an additional unit of
tax exceeds the reduction of bene¯ts from private consumption, i.e., ®N >
ei
2pxpy.
If, for instance, ®N > E
2pxpy e±ciency considerations always suggest truthful
3Existing experimental studies on tax compliance implement penalties for underreporting
along with certain probabilities of detection. These features have been criticized to lead astray
because designing tax compliance as a decision under risk impedes separating risk preferences




i = Ei for all Ei 2 [E;E]. For the experiment we choose
parameters such that a rational taxpayer declares zero income although positive




ii) S-scheme: speci¯c commodity tax (¿ > 0, t > 0): Assume that in addition
to an income tax with rate ¿ < ¿ there is now a speci¯c tax t > 0 on the
























In the optimum it holds: ex¤
i = ei=2 + z, where z =
®tpxpy
2 . Payo® in the



















Our parameters assure that ® <
ei¡tpxpx
2px(1+t)py < ®N for all possible choices of di
and endowments Ei 2 [E;E]. Again, under these conditions rational taxpayers
declare zero income (d¤




2.1 Details of the Design
There are 4 phases. Each phase consists of 15 periods. In phase 0 in every
period subjects choose the quantities of the goods x and y they wish to buy.
This phase serves to make subjects familiar with the consumption choice task,
so yet no taxes apply. In phase 1 the members of each group at the ballot ¯rst
choose between the two alternatives, general tax on declared income at rate ¿
(G-scheme) or speci¯c tax at rate t plus a general tax at rate ¿ (S-scheme). The
regime supported by simple majority is then implemented for the subsequent 15
periods. Phase 1 ends after 15 periods. Phases 2 and 3 are one to one repetitions
of phase 1. Thus, there is a total of 3 votings followed by 15 periods of buying
commodities each.
6The experiment is parameterized in the following way: Endowments are drawn
from a uniform distribution Ei » U(110;190) points. Points are converted into
cash at the exchange rate of points 100 = Cents 25 (Euro 0:25). Points accu-
mulated during the experiment are paid out to participants immediately after
the experiment. For the income tax rate we choose ¿ = 0:5 in the G-scheme
and ¿ = 0:05 in the S-scheme. Prices are set at px = 1:1 and py = 50. The
rate for the speci¯c tax is t = 0:27 such that the after tax price of commodity
x is px(1 + t) ¼ 1:4. The size of a group is ¯ve, i.e., N = 5. The marginal per
capita return of the public good is set at ® = 0:5. By this parameter choice, the
restrictions discussed in the previous section are satis¯ed.
2.2 Predictions
In our design tax declarations are voluntary and the experiment is parameterized
such that a rational taxpayer abstains from paying taxes on income. Thus, if
people behave rationally, the S-scheme pareto-dominates the G-scheme. In other
words, with zero declarations payo®s for everyone are smaller under the general
tax [see eq. (3)] than under the speci¯c tax [see eq. (5)].
To illustrate, Table 1 shows individual payo® as a consequence of own and
others' tax declarations.4 If nobody declares any taxes, the S-scheme results in
22 % higher payo® than the G-scheme (124 vs. 102). The reason is that the
e±ciency cost arising from commodity taxation is small relative to the e±ciency
cost that prevails if the public good is not provided. Consequently, rational voters
would strictly prefer the S-scheme.
The assumption that people maximize their self-interest is a widely correct
simpli¯cation in economics. However, there are many instances where people
adhere to socially desirable behavior even if this is individually costly. Recently,
economists have proposed parsimonious speci¯cations of social preferences which
can explain such behavior across many situations (e.g., Rabin 1993, Fehr and
Schmidt 1999, Charness and Rabin 2002; for a recent survey, see, Camerer 2003,
4Payo®s in Table 1 are calculated under the assumptions that everyone in the group has the
same mean endowment, ^ E = 150, and consumption choices are optimal.
7Table 1
Own payo® under optimal consumption choices depending on own (i) and
others' (¡i) tax declarations in percent of ^ E = 150. (G-Scheme/S-Scheme)
own (i)
0.00 0.265 1.00
0.00 (102/124) (87/123) (63/120)
others' (¡i) 0.265 (142/128) (127/127) (103/123)
1.00 (252/138) (237/136) (213/133)
Ch. 2). In our design voluntary tax declarations are mutually bene¯cial be-
tween taxpayers. In this setup social preferences give rise to tax morale (for a
similar argument, see, Alm, McClelland, and Schulze 1992). A behavioral ap-
proach based on social preferences, therefore, hypothesizes that people declare
substantial fractions of their endowments for taxation.
Furthermore, if taxpayers' behavior deviates from what standard economics
predicts, what consequences are there for the political feasibility of a particular
tax regime? Our guess is that taxpayers may anticipate tax morale and for this
reason vote for the general tax scheme. In Table 1, if everybody declares more
than 26.5 % of endowment, the G-scheme dominates the S-scheme. If everybody
declares taxes honestly, payo® is even 60 % higher in the general than in the
speci¯c tax scheme (213 vs. 133). Moreover, voting for the G-scheme may serve
people as a signal to establish tax morale. Indeed, previous experimental studies
have found that voting in favor of socially desirable rules is capable to generate
norm compliant behavior even if the norm ex post cannot be formally enforced
(see, Alm, McClelland, and Schulze 1999; Tyran and Feld 2001).
3 Results
Experiments were run in May 2003 at the University of Innsbruck. In total we had
75 subjects participating in four sessions. Subjects were undergraduate students
8from various majors. The experiment was programmed and conducted using the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999). Including Euro 4 for show up on time, the
average subject earned Euro 20.7 within approximately 2 hours.
In section 3.1 we evaluate the e±ciency of the G-scheme relative to the S-
scheme based on actual behavior. In section 3.2 we discuss voting behavior.
3.1 E±ciency
In our setup we measure e±ciency simply in terms of payo®s. Figure 1 depicts
payo®s averaged across subjects and di®erentiated by tax schemes. In phases
1 and 2, subjects on average earn slightly more in the G-scheme than in the
S-scheme; but as the ¯gure indicates, the di®erences are small and insigni¯cant
(Phase 1: 121 versus 117 experimental points, p= 0:397, Mann-Whitney test,
one-sided, based on statistically independent group observations; Phase 2: 120
versus 116 points, p= 0:443). Only in phase 3 payo®s are smaller in the G-scheme
than in the S-scheme (115 versus 124, p= 0:056). To test whether overall there is
a di®erence in e±ciency between the two schemes we calculate a regression based
t-test: we regress individual payo®s on variables for the period, tax declarations
relative to endowment, and dummies for phases. To account for statistical depen-
dence within groups we calculate robust standard errors adjusted for clustering
on groups. According to this test, there is no di®erence in payo®s between the
tax schemes (p = 0:568). We summarize:
Result 1 Payo®s do not di®er between tax schemes, i.e., the G-scheme is equally
e±cient as the S-scheme.
In Figure 1, the grey dotted line at 102 and the black dotted line at 124 in-
dicate the equilibrium predictions for the G-scheme and S-scheme, respectively
(compare, Table 1). Apparently, result 1 would not prevail under standard pre-
dictions. We now turn to the question why payo®s deviate from theoretical
predictions.
As we have discussed in section 2.2, tax morale provides a reason for payo®s
to exceed theoretical predictions. If taxpayers voluntarily declare endowment
9points for taxation, this has large e®ects when the tax rate is high (¿), as in the
G-scheme. In contrast, it has only modest e®ects when the tax rate is low (¿), as
in the S-scheme. In the G-scheme, subjects on average have declared 21% of their
endowment for taxation. In the S-scheme the respective number is 32%. Due to
the di®erence in the tax rate on declared endowment, nevertheless, average taxes
from declared endowment are much higher in the G-scheme (15.3 points) than
in the S-scheme (2.3 points). Taking as a basis for statistical testing 5 groups
that have experienced both tax schemes, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test reveals that
this di®erence is signi¯cant (p = 0:043, two-sided). This means that the amount
of taxes that taxpayers pay voluntarily is larger in the G-scheme than in the
S-scheme. In other words:
Result 2 Tax morale is higher in the G-scheme than in the S-scheme.
Tax morale induces e±ciency gains from the provision of the public good.
In addition, result 2 suggests a stronger demand e®ect for tax morale in the G-
scheme than in the S-scheme.5 This explains why payo®s are above equilibrium
in the G-scheme. On the other hand, we still need to explain why payo®s stay
behind equilibrium in the S-scheme. The straightforward answer to this question
is that participants in the experiment not always manage to buy the optimal
consumption bundles. We de¯ne consumption e±ciency as the actual payo® from









4px(1+t)py in the S-scheme. Our data reveals that there
is some ine±ciency in consumption in both tax regimes: In phase 1 e±ciency
is 90.6% in the G-scheme and 89.5% in the S-scheme. The di®erence between
schemes is insigni¯cant (p=0.602, Mann-Whitney test). In phase 2 e±ciency is
93.2% in both schemes; in phase 3 the respective numbers are 93.3% and 95.4%
(p = 0:312).
Non-optimal consumption choices cut down on payo®s regardless of the tax
regime. However, tax morale o®sets these ine±ciencies in the G-scheme, whereas
5Another way to see this is that although switching between the S-scheme and the G-scheme
increases the income tax rate by factor ten (from ¿ = 0:05 to ¿ = 0:5), actual tax declarations
relative to endowment di®er only by 11 percentage points on average (32% in the S-scheme
and 21% in the G-scheme).
10this is not the case in the S-scheme. This explains why payo®s stay behind the-
oretical predictions in the S-scheme, but are above predictions in the G-scheme.
We state this as our next result:
Result 3 Tax morale is the cause for result 1. In our design, tax morale is
su±cient to suspend with the theoretical need to supplement an e±cient income
tax by a speci¯c commodity tax.
Figure 1











Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
A ¯nal observation deserves attention: In the last phase average payo®s have
been smaller in the G-scheme than in the S-scheme (see, Figure 1). The cause
for this observation is that the commodity tax of the S-scheme provides constant
funding for the public good, whereas tax morale decreases during the course of
the experiment. In the S-scheme, average per period individual commodity-tax
payments are 15.2, 15.3, and 16.7 in phases 1, 2, and 3, respectively. In contrast,
in the G-scheme average tax declarations start at 25.1 % in phase 1, and go
down to 20.6% and 16.9% in phases 2 and 3, respectively. As a result, individual
income-tax payments drop from 18.5 points in phase 1 to 15.2 and 12.3 points in
11phases 2 and 3, respectively. Because of this dynamic the S-scheme eventually
raises higher total tax receipts to fund the public good and, as a consequence,
payo®-dominates the G-scheme in phase 3. We conclude:
Result 4 Tax morale erodes over time, what eventually suggests to supplement
the non-enforceable income tax by a speci¯c commodity tax in our design.
3.2 Voting Behavior
While results 1 to 3 are di±cult to reconcile with standard assumptions, result
4 suggest that tax compliance still converges to theoretical predictions. Hence,
the conclusion from our study regarding the practical conduct of tax policy are
inclusive so far. In any case the implementation of policy measure is often not
possible by dictatorial means. For this reason, we not only want to know which
tax scheme is e±cient. We also wish to know which tax scheme is politically
accepted. With respect to voting we report the following result:
Result 5 Subjects overwhelmingly vote in favor of the general income tax regime
(G-scheme). There is no empirical tendency for choices to converge towards the
speci¯c commodity tax regime (S-scheme).
Figure 2 provides support for this result. The ¯gure shows the frequency
of groups that have implemented the G-scheme and the S-scheme, respectively.
The vertical axis depicts relative frequencies; absolute frequencies are written on
the bars. In the ¯rst vote, 11 out of 15 groups (73 percent) approved of the G-
scheme (black bar); only 4 groups chose the S-scheme (shaded bar). According
to a binomial test, approval of the G-scheme is signi¯cantly higher (p=0.059).
Taking individual behavior, there are 49 out of 75 subjects voting in favor of
the G-scheme. Again, this result reveals a bias in subjects' decisions in favor of
the G-scheme (p=0.003).6 These ¯ndings reject the hypothesis that taxpayers
support the commodity-income tax mix of the S-scheme.
6We provide this test for illustrative reasons only. Note, however, that individual observa-
tions are statistically dependent within groups.
12Figure 2 furthermore shows that this pattern persists along the sequence of
the experiment: in both, the second and third vote, 80 percent (13/15) of groups
vote for the G-scheme. Thus, we do not observe choices to converge towards the
S-scheme. At the level of individuals there is no statistically detectable learning
behavior, neither. Between the ¯rst and the second vote, 11 subjects who have
previously voted in favor of the income tax scheme switched their the decision
towards the commodity tax scheme. There were, however, 11 other subjects
who switched choices into the reverse direction. Between the second and the
third vote, 9 subjects who have previously voted for the G-scheme switched to
the S-scheme, against 9 subjects who switched into the reverse. These numbers
illustrate that choices do not converge to any particular tax design.
Figure 2
Frequency of groups approving of the G-scheme [black] and the S-scheme
[shaded]. N=15.





























In the previous section we have reported that payo®s hardly di®er between
schemes. Therefore, it is not clear a priori why so many subjects favor the G-
scheme. To further explore this issue we provide a closer analysis of individual
payo®s. In particular, we ask whether it has been individually rational to support
the income tax scheme. To answer this question we take actual income tax dec-
13larations in the G-scheme and compare payo®s against hypothetical payo®s as
they would result from commodity taxation in the S-scheme. Since for this com-
parison we do not observe consumption choices under the S-scheme, we assume
that subjects buy the optimal commodity bundles in both schemes; i.e., payo®s in
the G-scheme are recalculated based on optimal consumption choices and actual
tax-declarations according to eq. (3). These payo®s are then compared against
payo®s according to eq. (5) assuming the same individual tax declarations.
There are 14 out of 15 groups who voted at least once in favor of the G-scheme.
Based on the above calculation, after implementing the scheme for the ¯rst time,
9 of these groups by a majority of their subjects do better in the G-scheme than
they hypothetically would have done in the S-scheme. According to a binomial
test this number is di®erent from random (p=0.090). Taking individual data,
this corresponds to 40 out of 70 subjects, whose payo®s under the rules of the
G-scheme exceed hypothetical ones of the S-scheme. Again, this number di®ers
from random (p=0.094).
Does this pattern persist? To answer this question we look at the behavior
of subjects who voted in favor of the income tax also a second and third time.
12 out of 14 groups that have accepted the G-scheme once implement it also for
a second time. Only 5 out of these 12 groups (p=0.212) by majority of their
members manage to sustain pro¯ts higher than the hypothetical ones under the
rules of the S-scheme. Finally, 9 out of 12 groups that have accepted it twice also
vote in favor of the G-scheme a third time. In phase 3, there remain only 3 out
of these 9 groups (p=0.746) that by majority of their members would still have
hypothetically done better in this scheme. We conclude:
Result 6 In the ¯rst vote, votes are consistent with actual payo®s, i.e., for a
majority of subjects voting in favor of the G-scheme can be ex post rationalized
by payo® considerations. In the subsequent two votes many subjects continue
voting in favor of the G-scheme even if tax declarations are low and their earning
would have been higher under the alternative S-scheme.
Why does the S-scheme receive so little support? One potential reason is
that subjects hold ex-ante beliefs of high tax morale on behalf of their fellow
14taxpayers. Such a belief would rationalize a vote for the G-scheme. In the light
of result 6 it appears odd, however, that many subjects continue to vote in favor
of the G-scheme in phase 3 even after they have experienced that tax morale
went down.
An alternative explanation comes from cognitive psychology. Recent contri-
butions by Slemrod and Krishna (2003), and McCa®ery (2000) emphasize the
relevance of cognitive theory to taxation. In our setup, subjects earn payo®s
from two sources: from private consumption and from consuming a public good.
In comparing the two tax regimes, subjects know for sure that the payo® from
private consumption will be smaller in the S-scheme than in the G-scheme.7 In
contrast, subjects may ¯nd it di±cult to predict how a switch between the tax
regimes would change their earnings from the public good. Such a di®erence
in the saliency of expected changes in payo®s may contribute to explain why
subjects' choices are biased in favor of the G-scheme.
Our experiment was not aimed to rigorously test for the validity of such
arguments. Whatever explanation is valid, result 5 is incompatible with standard
theory. Our study, therefore, exempli¯es a case where predictions and guidelines
derived from standard theory of optimal taxation would fail in an attempt to
render tax reform feasible or to explain the endogenous evolution of tax design.
4 Conclusion
Slemrod (1990) in a general assessment argues that the theory of optimal taxation
is incomplete as a guide to action unless it accounts for tax evasion. Recent con-
tributions that have met this concern challenge long standing insights of optimal
taxation theory regarding the optimal tax mix. Particularly, distortionary com-
modity taxes may become part of the optimal tax structure when tax evasion is
possible. In this experiment we have designed a case for which the theory makes
a strong claim to supplement an e±cient income tax by a speci¯c commodity
7Subjects are explicitly told that the tax induces an increase in the price of commodity x.
See appendix for instructions.
15tax. This is the case when the income tax as the ¯rst-best solution can be evaded
whereas the commodity tax cannot.
The main result is that tax morale plays an essential role in trading o® tax
evasion against tax distortion. In our experiment, tax morale materializes as
disposition to pay taxes to fund a public good against an individual incentive to
free-ride. We ¯nd that tax morale overall is su±cient to suspend with the need
for additional commodity taxation. A second result is that tax morale erodes un-
der stationary repetition. Our design in many instances is similar to a voluntary
contribution experiments, which typically ¯nd a decay in cooperation in repeated
interaction (see, Ledyard 1995). Recent experimental research has shown that
this patters is highly sensitive to factors like punishment opportunities, social
identi¯cation, or communication (for a survey, see, e.g., Camerer 2003). In con-
text of tax evasion already weak means of economic deterrence can sustain tax
morale in multi-round experiments (Alm, McClelland, and Schulze 1992, Tyran
and Feld 2001). On the other hand, countries nowadays frequently bemoan a
decline in tax morale (see, e.g., Schneider and Enste 2003). Therefore, we may
wish to learn more on how to manage a norm of tax compliance in the ¯eld (for
some discussion, see, Besley, Preston, and Ridge 1997, Kahan 1997, Fehr and
Falk 2002).
A ¯nal result of our study regards the political acceptance of tax measures. In
our experiment taxpayers hardly choose the tax regime which is favored by stan-
dard theory. Rather they choose an alternative which is not feasible in the stan-
dard approach. This observation exempli¯es the power of behavioral economics:
modi¯cations of the standard assumptions in the direction of more psychological
realism need not be radical to have large-scale e®ects. We therefore believe that
there is a strong need to incorporate behavioral motives of tax compliance into
the debate on optimal tax systems.
Our research has highlighted the role of tax morale within the quest for an
optimal tax design. Institutional design assuming agents who react optimally
to the substitution of a commodity tax by an income tax (or vice versa) may
recommend the wrong or at least an inadequate measure when agents systemat-
ically deviate from rational choice. In the case at hand opportunistic optimality
16would mean to avoid income tax payment and thereby to question the provi-
sion of public goods. But this is not what we observe. Thus the behavioral
approach to institutional or mechanism design, which puts emphasis on actual
decision behavior, may come to di®erent conclusions and recommendations. This
stresses the necessity to supplement optimal tax design by one paying tribute
to how people actually react to public good provision and their tax ¯nancing.
Our study is a step into this direction. We hope that our study will motivate
further research on behavioral aspects of taxation in an attempt to develop an
encompassing framework of optimal taxation.
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19Appendix. Sample instructions (originally in German)
General Instructions. Part I: Thank you for participating in the experiment.
You receive Euro 4 for having shown up on time. If you read these instructions carefully
and follow all the rules, you can earn more. The Euro 4 and all additional amount of
money will be paid to you in cash immediately after the experiment. During the
experiment we shall not speak of euros but rather of points. Points are converted to
euros at the following exchange rate: 100 Points = 25 Cents (Euro 0.25).
It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment. If
you have any questions, please ask us. We will gladly answer your questions individu-
ally. It is very important that you follow this rule, otherwise we shall have to exclude
you from the experiment and from all payments.
Detailed Instructions: The experiment is divided into periods. In every period
you receive an amount of points, which we refer to as your endowment. Your endowment
is a randomly generated integer number between 110 and 190 points. Every number
between 110 and 190 is equally likely to occur. You will learn your endowment in every
period.
In every period you make the following decisions: you have to decide how to
use you endowment for the purchase of two commodities X and Y. The quantities you
can buy depend on your endowment and in the prices of commodities X and Y:
The price of commodity X is 1.1 points.
The price of commodity Y is 50 points.
Example: Your endowment is 150 points. You buy X = 68:18 units of commodity
X and Y = 1:5 units of commodity Y. With that purchase you exactly use up your
endowment [(68:18 £ 1:1) + (1:5 £ 50) = 150].
How your income is determined: Your income is the product of the units of X and
Y you buy:
Your income = X £ Y
In the above example you have bought X = 68:18 units of X and Y = 1:5 units of Y.
Thus, your income is 102.27 (= 68.18 £ 1.5) points.
You will take your decisions by computer. At the beginning of every period you will see
the following input screen (original instructions included a screen-¯gure here). The number
of the period appears in the top left corner of the screen. In the top right corner, you
20can see how many seconds remain to take your decision. The ¯rst line shows \Your
Endowment" in the current period. In the input ¯elds below you must enter the units
of commodities wish to buy. Con¯rm your choice by pressing the OK button.
Please note:
² If time expires before you have made a choice your income is zero.
² Your expenditures on commodity purchases may not exceed your endowment.
² Endowment not spent on the purchase of commodities result in zero income.
At the end of a period, a result screen will appear (original instructions included a screen-
¯gure here). Here, your decisions are summarized again. In this example the participant
has purchases 68.18 units of commodity X and 1.5 units of commodity Y. The last line
shows your income in points (here: 102.27).
Instructions. Part II:
The experiment will now continue for additional 15 periods under the following rules:
Participants are randomly assembled into groups of 5 persons; i.e. apart from you there
will be 4 additional persons in your group. The composition of your group remains the
same in each period. That is, your group members will be the same in every period.
The identity of your group members will not be revealed to you at any time.
In this part of the experiment taxes are raised to fund a project. The project generates
income for you and the other participants. There are two di®erent kinds of taxes:
1. A tax of ¿ ("tau") percent on your endowment. You will shortly be informed
about the percentage size of ¿.
2. A tax of 27 percent imputed into the price of commodity X.
In every period you take two decisions:
1. First you decide how much of your endowment you declare for the purpose to be
taxed. Of the endowment you declare for taxation ¿ percent will be deducted as
tax. The endowment that remains to you after taxation is called your remaining
endowment.
Example: The tax rate tau is 50 percent (¿ = 0:5). Your endowment is 170
points. You declare 40 points. From these 40 points there will be 20 (40 £ 0.5)
points deducted as tax. Your remaining endowment is then 150 points (170¡20).
212. After your remaining endowment is determined you decide again how to use it
for the purchase of commodities X and Y. The quantities you can buy now also
depend on whether good X is taxed.
{ If commodity X is taxed, its price is 1.4 points; i.e. from its previous price
of 1.1. points the price of commodity X rises by 27 percent. If commodity
X is not taxed, its price remains at 1.1 points.
{ The price of commodity Y remains at 50 points.
Example: Your remaining endowment is 150 points. Commodity X is taxed such
that its price is 1.4 points. Commodity Y's price is 50 points. You buy X=56.42
units of commodity X and Y=1.42 units of commodity Y. With that purchase
you exactly use up your remaining endowment [(56:42£1:4)+(1:42£50) = 150].
How your income is determined: Your income consists of two parts:
(1) Your income from the project. This income is determined as follows:
Income from the project = 0.5 £ sum of all individual tax payments
The income from the project is determined in the same way for all other partic-
ipants; i.e., they receive the same income from the project. For example, if you
and the other participants pay in sum 200 points in taxes, you and the other
participants will earn 100 (= 0.5 £ 200) points, each. If you and the other par-
ticipants pay in sum, e.g., 20 points in taxes, you and the other participants will
earn 10 (= 0.5 £ 20) points.
How the your individual tax payments is determined: Your tax pay-
ments are, ¯rst, ¿ percent of the endowment you declare for taxation. Second,
if commodity X is taxed your expenditure for purchasing commodity X includes
a tax of 27 percent. (To calculate the exact amount of commodity tax multiply the
purchased units of X with the net price and the tax rate; i.e., X £ 1.1 £ 0.27.)
(2) Your income from purchasing commodities. As previously, this income is the
product of units of X and Y you buy:
Your income = X £ Y
In the above example you have bought X=56.42 units of X and Y=1.42 units of
Y. Thus, your income is 80.12 (= 56.42 £ 1.42) points.
22Voting Proposal
Before the experiment will start under the new rules, you and the other 4 par-
ticipants in your group vote between two alternatives how to fund the project. The
alternative that is wins the majority of votes (i.e., 3 or more) is implemented for the
next 15 periods.
Alternative 1:
² The tax ¿ on your declared endowment is ¿ = 0:05 (= 5 percent)
² Commodity X is taxed; its price is 1:4 points.
Alternative 2:
² The tax ¿ on your declared endowment is ¿ = 0:5 (= 50 percent)
² Commodity X is not taxed; its price is 1:1 points.
Please note:
Under alternative 1 participants pay taxes if they purchase commodity X. Since com-
modity X has become more expensive and you can buy less units from it, you will earn
less income from commodity purchase. On the other hand, you will earn income from
the project even if you and the other participants do not declare any endowment for
the purpose to be taxed.
Under alternative 2 participants pay taxes only if they declare endowment for taxation.
The more you declare, the less you can earn form commodity purchase. On the other
hand, the more you declare the higher is the income from the project that you and the
other participants receive.
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